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Abstract—Advances in deep learning have made face recogni-
tion increasingly feasible and pervasive. While useful to social
media platforms and users, this technology carries significant
privacy threats. Coupled with the abundant information they
have about users, service providers can associate users with social
interactions, visited places, activities, and preferences - some
of which the user may not want to share. Additionally, facial
recognition models used by various agencies are trained by data
scraped from social media platforms. Existing approaches to mit-
igate these privacy risks from unwanted face recognition result
in an imbalanced privacy-utility trade-off to the users. In this
paper, we address this trade-off by proposing Face-Off, a privacy-
preserving framework that introduces minor perturbations to
the user’s face to prevent it from being correctly recognized. To
realize Face-Off, we overcome a set of challenges related to the
black box nature of commercial face recognition services, and the
lack literature for adversarial attacks on metric networks. We
implement and evaluate Face-Off to find that it deceives three
commercial face recognition services from Microsoft, Amazon,
and Face++. Our user study with 330 participants further shows
that the perturbations come at an acceptable cost for the users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enabled by advances in deep learning, face recognition
is becoming increasingly pervasive in several contexts, such
as social media, online photo storage applications, and law
enforcement [31]. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and
Amazon provide their users various services built atop face
recognition, including automatic tagging and grouping of faces.
Users share their photos with these platforms, which then
(a) detect (through semantic segmentation) and (b) recognize
the faces present in these photos. These forms of automated
recognition, however, pose privacy threats to users, induce bias,
and violate legal frameworks [1], [31]. These organizations
operate black box recognition and segmentation models that
allow for associating users with social interactions, visited
places, activities, and preferences - some of which the user
may not want to share.
Existing approaches to mitigate these privacy risks from
unwanted identification result in an imbalanced privacy-
utility trade-off to the users. These solutions rely on (a)
blurring/obscuring/morphing faces [10], (b) having the users
utilize physical objects, such as eyeglass frames with special
patterns, clothes worn by the user, scenery around the user,
etc. [26], [27], and (c) evading face detection by dodging
the face detector [4]. These solutions, however, exhibit two
main drawbacks: (a) the user is no longer able to meet her
original goal in using the social media platform, especially
when various applications built atop of face detection, such
as face-enhancement features, are broken, and (b) specially
manufactured physical obfuscation objects are not omnipresent.
Fig. 1: Adversarial example of Matt Damon generated by
Face-Off recognized as Leonardo DiCaprio by Google image
search.
Relying on insights from previous work [26], [27], [4], we
propose a new paradigm to improve the trade-off between
privacy and utility for such users. In adversarial machine
learning, carefully crafted images result in small and human-
imperceptible perturbations that cause misclassifications [29],
[9], [6]. In this paper, we extend this approach from classifica-
tion models to the recognition/verification domain. In particular,
we propose Face-Off, a privacy-preserving adversarial attack
scheme against real-world face recognition systems. By care-
fully designing the adversarial perturbation, Face-Off targets
only face recognition (and not face detection), preserving the
user’s original intention along with context associated with
the image. Face-Off detects a user’s face(s) from an image
to-be-uploaded, applies the necessary adversarial perturbation
on the face, and returns the image with a perturbed face. The
objective of Face-Off is to allow a service provider to detect
faces in the image but prevent it from attributing the image to
the correct person. Meanwhile, the perturbation should be kept
at a minimal level.
In the course of realizing Face-Off, we face the following
challenges:
• Unlike classifiers face verification/recognition networks
are metric learning systems that aim at representing
each input as a feature embedding [25], [30], [15].
Real-world face recognition takes place by mapping the
feature embedding to the closest cluster of faces. Existing
adversarial attacks only focus on classifiers, and must be
retrofit for verification networks.
• As the models used by these organizations are proprietary,
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Face-Off needs to perform black box attacks. This is
known to be difficult in the classifier domain [29], [6],
[21]. Further, Face-Off cannot use the service provider’s
face recognition API as a black box oracle to generate
the adversarially perturbed face [26] for two reasons.
First, generating an adversarial example requires querying
the API extensively, which is not free and is often rate-
limited. Second, querying the black box model defeats
our purpose for privacy protection as it sometimes begins
with releasing the original face [26].
We address the first challenge by designing two new loss
functions for the adversarial attack specifically targeting metric
learning systems. These loss functions aim to pull the input
face away from a cluster of faces belonging to the user (in the
embedding space), which results in incorrect face recognition.
Both loss functions can be integrated with the state-of-the-
art adversarial attacks against classifiers [6], [17], thereby
providing the additional benefit of being compatible with
advances in adversarial attack schemes for classifiers.
To meet the second challenge, we leverage the property of
transferability, where an adversarial example generated for one
model is also adversarial for another. We rely on substitute
face recognition models which we have full access to generate
adversarial examples. After perturbing the face using these
substitute models, Face-Off amplifies the perturbation by a
small multiplicative factor α as to enhance transferability. This
property ensures that verification networks will not recognize
our perturbed faces. Amplification has been shown to improve
the robustness of adversarial examples for classifiers [5]. In this
paper, we further explore amplification and show it enhances
transferability in metric networks and reduces the time required
to generate an adversarial example.
Apart from the aforementioned loss function, Face-Off is a
framework that incorporates two other components: a white
box model serving as substitute model and an adversarial
attack algorithm. In our implementation, we use two recently
proposed and high accuracy face recognition models [25],
[36] as white box models. For the attack algorithm, Face-Off
utilizes the Carlini & Wagner [6] and the projected gradient
descent [17] attacks - two of the latest and most effective
adversarial example generation strategies. Users of Face-Off
can vary different parameters associated with its components
to determine their desired trade-off between privacy gains, the
utility of the image, and execution time.
We evaluate Face-Off using a set of celebrity photos across
three major commercial face recognition services: Microsoft
Azure Face API 1, AWS Rekognition 2, and Face++ 3. Face-Off
generates images, with low perturbation, that transfer to these
three services. After applying sufficient amplification, Face-
Off achieves nearly 100% privacy protection by preventing all
three services from correctly recognizing the input face. Our
adversarial examples also transfer to Google image search (Fig.
1https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/face/
2https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/
3https://www.faceplusplus.com/
1) successfully with the target labels. Finally, we perform a
user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 330 participants
to evaluate user perception of the perturbed faces. Through
our user studies, we determine that the degree of perturbation
in the images that transfer is acceptable to end-users; privacy-
conscious users are willing to tolerate greater perturbation
levels for improved privacy.
In summary, we offer the following contributions in this
paper:
1) We design a set of loss functions that target adversarial
examples for metric networks (§ IV). We also highlight
how amplification improves transferability across both
metric (§ V) and classification networks (§ VII).
2) We design, implement and evaluate Face-Off, which
applies adversarial perturbation to prevent real-world face
recognition platforms from correctly tagging user’s face
(§ VIII). We confirm Face-Off’s capabilities across three
major commercial face recognition services: Microsoft
Azure Face API, AWS Rekognition, and Face++.
3) We perform a user study (including 330 participants) to
assess the user-perceived utility of the images that Face-
Off generates (§ VI).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Face Recognition
State-of-the-art face recognition platforms utilize verification
models. The model takes a pair of faces as inputs and performs
some form of matching to determine if these two faces belong to
the same individual. To do so, the verification model generates
a fixed length embedding for each input image and compares
the distance between embeddings. The networks used for this
purpose are sometimes called Siamese networks [25], [36], and
this type of learning is referred to as metric embedding or metric
learning [39], [35]. Compared to classification, verification
can scale to an arbitrary number of identities. As a result,
modern applications tend to resort to verification for face
recognition tasks 45. Throughout this paper, face recognition
refers exclusively to face verification. Due to the fundamental
different working principle of face verification, the model
inference and training processes differ from conventional
classifiers; below, we provide a brief introduction.
Architectures: A standard classification model employs a deep
neural network Fθ , where θ represents the model parameters.
For an input x∈Rm, the network generates y=Fθ (x). Typically,
the last layer of the network employs a softmax function which
generates the probability distribution y∈Rn. Here, yi represents
the probability of the input x belonging to class i.
On the other hand, a verification model consists of two
identical feedforward networks - F1θ and F
2
θ . For a pair of
input faces x1,x2 ∈ Rn, each sister network produces a fixed
length feature vector Zi = F iθ (xi) for i = 1,2 respectively. We
4How does Facebook’s face recognition work? https://www.facebook.com/
help/122175507864081
5Google Photos Face Grouping. https://support.google.com/photos/answer/
\6128838?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en
refer to this feature vector as the embedding of the input
face [25]. The last layer of the Siamese network computes the
distance (typically `2-norm) between embedding Z1 and Z2,
which is then used for verification. In the remainder of this
paper, we refer to this distance as the feature distance.
Loss Functions: Unlike classification models that supervise the
training process with loss functions such as cross-entropy loss,
training verification models requires different functions. These
include contrastive loss [7], [11] and triplet loss [25], [34],
[8]. Recent approaches in face recognition explore new loss
functions to improve performance. For example, using center
loss [36], the neural network is trained to cluster embedding
of samples with the same identity closely around a centroid.
Another example is angular-softmax loss [15], which imposes
discriminative constraints on a hypersphere manifold.
B. Adversarial Examples
While neural networks represent the state-of-the-art for
various classification tasks, they are vulnerable to a variety
of adversarial attacks [22], [38]. It is possible to misclassify
input images with carefully crafted, human-imperceptible
perturbations [29]. These adversarial examples can also cause
(adversary-chosen) targeted misclassification. While some
defenses exist, they are shown to be at tension with utility [17].
Adversarial Example Generation: For a given input x ∈ Rn,
recall that y = Fθ (x) denotes the probability distribution of the
outputs. An adversarial example x′ = x+ δ is one such that
argmaxi Fθ (x) 6= argmaxi Fθ (x′), where c = argmaxi y denotes
the label of the most probable classification output. The
problem of determining the perturbation δ is typically modeled
as a constraint optimization problem, with the objective of
minimizing the p-norm of perturbation:
minimize ‖δ‖p
subject to argmax
i
Fθ (x) 6= argmax
i
Fθ (x′) (untargeted)
OR
subject to argmax
i
Fθ (x′) = t (targeted)
where t is an attacker chosen label. As the above optimization
problem is hard to solve in practice, different practical solutions
have been proposed. We refer the curios reader to solutions by
Carlini and Wagner [6] (henceforth referred to as CW), and
Madry et al. [17] (henceforth referred to as PGD).
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In the following section, we present the threat model we
consider, as well as a high-level overview of Face-Off.
A. System and Threat Models
A user takes a photo and shares it on a social media platform
(such as Facebook or Instagram). The online platform first
utilizes a face detector to identify the faces in the photo, and
then applies face recognition to tag the faces. Once each photo
has been indexed by the set of people appearing in it, the
platform can perform additional inferences about the behavior
of people, places they visit, activities they engage in, and their
social circles [1]. Additionally, these photos can be scraped
by various services, and later used by various governmental
agencies [31]. Thus, we assume the platform to be an “honest-
but-curious" entity. This prolonged analysis of user photos
allows the platform (and other agencies that use these photos)
to profile users. This in turn enables targeted advertising, and
potentially monitoring and surveillance at the behest of a nation-
state. We characterize the social media platform as follows:
1. It uses proprietary black box model(s) for face recognition.
2. The users upload images of various sizes, resolutions, and
formats to the platform. The platform successfully (or with
high probability) recognizes faces in all of them.
B. High Level Overview of Face-Off
To prevent the platform from recognizing a user’s face, we
design Face-Off, a tool that generates perturbations that induce
failures. At a high level, Face-Off operates as follows (Fig. 2):
1) Receives the desired image from the user.
2) Detects and extracts faces.
3) Resizes the faces as required by the adversarial example
generation pipeline (refer § IV-B).
4) Generates perturbation for the faces.
5) Returns a perturbed image of the original size (to upload).
We envision two deployment models of Face-Off.
1. Trusted Cloud: Face-Off’s GPU-powered cloud service
receives detected faces from the client on the user’s machine.
It applies the necessary perturbation and returns the perturbed
images for the user. Note that the cloud service only receives
low-resolution faces (which are detected and cropped locally) to
generate the adversarial perturbation. With the input face, Face-
Off requires additional information of limited size, which we
elaborate in § VIII-G. Face-Off resizes, amplifies, and applies
the perturbation to the image locally.
2. Local Deployment: While the former approach involves
trusting the cloud, the local deployment can perform all
operations locally at the client.
In § VIII-G, we evaluate the running time of both these
deployment models.
C. Challenges
Achieving the aforementioned functionality is challenging.
We highlight several reasons below:
C1. Verification based architectures use a different loss func-
tion (as described in § II) than those used in existing work
on adversarial example generation. New loss functions
are to be designed to bridge the gap.
C2. The models used by the platform are black box.
C3. Our attacks utilize substitute models that mirror the black
box models to only some degree. Thus, the generated
adversarial examples must transfer.
C4. Since Face-Off resizes the images, it is essential that the
perturbation generated for the scaled image transfers as
well, as it is resized and potentially compressed.
User uploads image
Face-Off intercepts 
upload and detects faces
User chooses 
faces to hide
Face-Off obtains 
small-scale 
perturbation
Face-Off resizes, 
amplifies and applies 
perturbation
Fig. 2: High-level overview of Face-Off’s processing pipeline.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first present our white box attack, and
then describe how we tweak the adversarial example to improve
transferability to black box models.
A. Attacks on Substitute Models
Our optimization is similar to that of Carlini et al. [6]:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖p+ c ·L (x+δ )
subject to x+δ ∈ [0,1]
where L (x+δ ) is a loss function that reflects the success of
the attack. c is a parameter, determining the weight of the loss
function with respect to the amplitude of perturbation.
Customized Loss Functions: To ensure that the attack is
successful for metric learning, we introduce:
1. Target loss is defined as the feature distance between the
adversarial example and a set of faces with a target label t.
This can be expressed as
Lt(x+δ ) =
∥∥∥∥∥Fθ (x+δ )− 1N N∑j=1 Fθ (x j,t)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
where xm,n denotes the mth sample with label n, N is the
total number of instances (x j,t). We refer to N as the batch
size.
2. Hinge loss simultaneously maximizes the feature distance
between the adversarial example and the original image (with
label o), in addition to what target loss achieves.
Lh(x+δ ) = max(A−B+κ,0)
A =
∥∥∥∥∥Fθ (x+δ )− 1N N∑j=1 Fθ (x j,t)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
B =
∥∥∥∥∥Fθ (x+δ )− 1N N∑j=1 Fθ (x j,o)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
When minimizing hinge loss, we use a parameter κ to control
the desired margin of the feature distance. Specifically, we
want the distance between the adversarial example and the
original instance (denoted by the term B) to be larger than the
distance between the adversarial example and the target instance
(denoted by the term A) by a certain amount. Achieving a larger
margin is equivalent to pushing the adversarial example further
into the decision space of the target label, which is likely to
improve transferability (refer § V).
Observe that minimizing the two loss functions amounts to
moving the adversarial image towards another (target) identity
in the embedding space. Given these loss functions (which
satisfy C1), we utilize a substitute network (which satisfies
C2) of known architecture and parameters (which we elaborate
in § VIII) to generate the desired adversarial example.
B. Black Box Attacks
We utilize the property of transferability to enable at-
tacks generated on known models to transfer to black-box
models [33]. This simple, yet powerful property has been
demonstrated extensively in prior work [6], [16], [32], [19].
We perform offline analysis to determine the best set of
parameters to use to minimize computational overhead. The
adversarial example generated using these parameters is then
amplified using a small multiplicative factor; while nominal
amplification does not impact discernibility, it improves trans-
ferability (which satisfies C3). Evidences of amplification exist
in previous work [5] to strengthen the adversarial example. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate its
utility in enhancing transferability.
Recall that the face is cropped and resized before being
perturbed. Since this size is not appropriate to return to the user,
we resize the resulting perturbed image back to the original size.
We observe that the resizing preserves transferability (which
satisfies C4). We hypothesize this to be the case because
black box APIs will resize the images as we do to perform
face recognition, consequently preserving the perturbation we
generate. We evaluate this hypothesis in § VIII.
V. LIPSCHITZ CONTINUITY
Theoretical Intuition: Let f be function from Rn to Rm where
n m. For example, Rn could denote the image space and
Rm could denote the embedding space. Given a closed and
compact sub-space S⊆Rn, we define the Lipschitz constant [2]
L f (S) as
sup{‖ f (x)− f (y) ‖‖ x− y ‖ : x,y ∈ S}
(a) center-to-center & CW (b) center-to-triplet & CW (c) center-to-center & PGD (d) center-to-triplet & PGD
Fig. 3: Lipschitz constant. (a) and (c) represent Fθ as the center loss model with CW and PGD attacks, respectively. (b) and (d)
show transferability from the center loss to the triplet loss model with the two attacks.
Our aim is to find sub-spaces S⊆Rn that have high L f (S); for
these sub-spaces, a small perturbation in the image space Rn
will lead to a high perturbation in the embedding space Rm.
Let x be an image, and A be an attack algorithm that for a
function f and input x outputs a perturbation A( f ,x) (i.e. for
intuition sake the reader can think of A as typical algorithms
for constructing adversarial examples – CW or PGD). Let δ =
A( f ,x) denote the adversarial perturbation. If B(z,β ) represents
a ball of radius β with center z), we observe the following
relationship (for moderate size of β ):
L f (B(x,β )) < L f (B(x+δ ,β ))
We believe that amplifying adversarial examples with
amplification factor results in the perturbed image lying in
the space with large Lipschitz constant. Prior work [37] further
provides evidence that points with large Lipschitz constant
have low robustness.
Empirical Validation: We conduct experiments to validate
that classifiers exhibits a large Lipschitz constant in the
(adversarial) subspaces of the input space. We consider a set
of 64 images belonging to the same person and two face
recognition architectures, which we name center and triplet.
We elaborate further on both classifiers in § VIII. We use both
CW and PGD attacks to generate adversarial examples over
the center model using different parameters – κ for CW and
ε for PGD (refer to the original papers for more details [6],
[17]).
Here, we aim to demonstrate the adversarial examples
exhibit larger Lipschitz constants or slopes than non-adversarial
examples. In particular, given two input images x1 and x2, we
report ‖Fθ (x1)−Fθ (x2)‖2‖x1−x2‖2 where Fθ (.) refers to the logits of either
the center or triplet model. We consider two cases, the first
is where x1 and x2 are two unperturbed images of the same
person. The second case is where x2 = x1+α.δ is an adversarial
example generated using either CW or PGD attacks on the
center model. Here, α ≥ 1 denotes the amplification factor.
We consider four scenarios (refer Fig. 3) computing the
slopes over the same center model and the triplet models over
both attacks. Fig. 3a shows, as a function of amplification, the
slope values of the adversarial examples over different κ values
for the CW attack. The gray strip in the plot corresponds to
the range of the slope values for the unperturbed images. Since
amplification is inapplicable for unperturbed images (i.e. δ = 0),
the gray strip is consistent throughout the plot. Similarly, the
rest of plots in Fig. 3 show the slopes when (a) Fθ is the triplet
model with the CW attack (Fig. 3b), (b) Fθ is the center model
with the PGD attack (Fig. 3c), and (c) Fθ is the triplet model
with the PGD attack (Fig. 3d). Fig. 3b and Fig. 3d correspond
to transferability to a black box model.
Takeaways: First, in all cases the slopes corresponding to
the adversarial images considerably exceed those of the
unperturbed images. Second, amplification of the perturbation
increases the slope of the output of the classifier, especially
for both the transferability cases. As evident from Fig. 3b
and Fig. 3d, the slope increases as we apply amplification. In
conclusion, examples in the input spaces of the models seem
to be associated with adversarial subspaces that have large
Lipschitz constant than space of legitimate examples. The plots
of Fig. 3 highlight a sample of those spaces over two models
(including one with transferability).
VI. USER STUDY
We conducted a user study to assess user-perceived utility
of the images that Face-Off generates. We performed this
assessment for samples generated using both CW and PGD
attacks. Through this study, we aim to understand the amount
of perturbation that users are willing to tolerate. We consider
two types of images: 1. portrait, where the user is the focus of
the image –Fig. 4, and 2. background, where the background
is the focus of the image, and the user is in the image –Fig. 5.
Study Highlights:
1) Privacy-conscious individuals are willing to tolerate larger
perturbation levels for improved privacy.
2) For the portrait image, 40% of respondents had no problem
in uploading a perturbed image to the social media
platform (the exact tolerable perturbation level, however,
differed among respondents).
3) For the background image, the vast majority of users
exhibited tolerance to higher image perturbation.
Participant Recruitment: We recruited a total of 167 and 163
Amazon MTurk master workers for the portrait and background
(a) α = 1.6 (b) α =1.7 (c) α =1.8 (d) α =1.9 (e) α =2.0 (f) α =2.1 (g) α =2.2
Fig. 4: Photos used in the user study for portrait case with the perturbation increasingly amplified.
(a) Original (b) α = 1 (c) α = 1.20 (d) α = 1.40 (e) α = 1.60 (f) α = 1.80 (g) α = 2
Fig. 5: Photos used in the user study for the background case with the perturbation increasingly amplified. The perturbation is
focused on the face region.
TABLE I: Demographics of Participants
Attribute Portrait Background
# Workers 167 163
Male 60.1% 68.7%
Female 39.9% 31.3%
Average Age (in years) 37 38
Privacy Preference
1. Conscious (PC) 75.44% 78%
2. Not Conscious (NPC) 24.56% 22%
Educational Qualification
1. Some High School 1.19% 1.22%
2. High School 11.97% 10.42%
3. Some College 17.96% 17.79%
4. Associate’s 10.17% 9.81%
5. Bachelor’s 47.90% 47.85%
6. Graduate 10.77% 12.83%
study, respectively. With this number of users, each image
in the portrait study received at least 5 ratings, and each
image in the background study received 163 ratings. Each
worker was compensated $1 for their effort, with an average
completion time of 6 minutes. We present the demographics
of the participants in Table I.
Study Design: We used a between-subject design by asking the
user to rate a different image every time. For each participant in
the portrait group, we display (a) 20 random images (each on
a different page) where the amplification factor α ∈ [1.4,2.4].
For participants in the background group, we show the same
20 images where α ∈ [1.4,2.4]. We choose this range as it
enables transferability.
After rating the images, we asked the respondents a set of
four questions on a 5-point Likert scale to gauge their privacy
concern levels. We utilize the “Concern for Privacy" [18] scale
which is modeled after the well-known “Information Privacy
Concern scale" of Smith et al. [28]. We use this set of questions
to divide the respondents into two groups: Privacy Conscious
(PC) and Not Privacy Conscious (NPC). Respondents belonging
to the first group are those who have answered all four questions
with either Strongly Agree or Agree. The second group of
respondents is those who responded with Neutral, Disagree, or
Strongly Disagree any of the questions. Finally, we require the
respondents to answer a set of general demographic questions.
The respondents were made aware that these questions are
optional and require no personally identifiable information.
Image Evaluation: For each displayed image, we asked the
respondents to answer the following question: “I have no
problem in uploading this photo to Facebook" on a 5-point
Likert scale. We discuss our observations for the portrait and
background scenarios.
1. Portrait Images: Each user was shown a set of im-
ages with a corresponding α (randomly chosen from
[1.4,2.4]) value unknown to the user. We grouped user
responses into 5 buckets corresponding to the ranges
[1.4,1.6), [1.6,1.8), [1.8,2), [2,2.2), [2.2,2.4]. These 5 buckets
represent increasing levels of perturbation.
We first discuss results for the NPC category (Fig. 6a); as
the amplification increases, the number of users who do not
wish to upload the image (the strongly disagree category i.e
the last column) also increases. The inverse is also true; as
the perturbation is lower, the number of participants who wish
to upload the image is higher (i.e. the first column). Similar
observations can be made for the PC category as well (Fig. 6b).
Combining both groups, we found that 40% of the respondents
are impartial to uploading at least one of the perturbed images.
It is worth noting that portrait images are a unique case, where
SA A N D SD
[1.4,1.6)
[1.6,1.8)
[1.8,2)
[2,2.2)
[2.2,2.4]
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.05
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.07
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.09
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09
(a) Not Privacy Conscious
SA A N D SD
[1.4,1.6)
[1.6,1.8)
[1.8,2)
[2,2.2)
[2.2,2.4]
0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07
0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.09
0.0 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.09
0.0 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.12
(b) Privacy Conscious
Fig. 6: The distribution of responses for the portrait scenario
for the privacy conscious and not privacy conscious groups.
Each cell value contains the portion of responses for a specific
amplification range and user satisfaction value (SA=Strong
Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree, DA=Strong Dis-
agree).
SA A N D SD
[1,2)
[2,3)
[3,4)
[4,5]
0.1 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.09 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.01
0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05
(a) Not Privacy Conscious
SA A N D SD
[1,2)
[2,3)
[3,4)
[4,5]
0.11 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.0
0.08 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.02
0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.05
0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.08
(b) Privacy Conscious
Fig. 7: The distribution of responses for the background
scenario for the privacy conscious and not privacy con-
scious groups. Each cell value contains the portion of re-
sponses for a specific amplification range and user satisfaction
value (SA=Strong Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree,
DA=Strong Disagree).
the subject is the highlight of these images, with a very limited
background context (refer Fig. 16). Thus, the perturbation is
more explicitly visible on the user’s face, accounting for the
responses received.
Nevertheless, we observe that the PC respondents are slightly
more inclined to accept perturbed images than NPC users. This
observation is evident from comparing Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b,
where the latter figure shows a higher density of responses in
the SA-A region. Further, we find the user perception to be
dependant on privacy consciousness in all five amplification
ranges (p < 0.05 according to the Chi-squared test after
applying the Holm-Bonferroni [12] method to correct for
multiple comparisons).
2. Background Images: Fig. 7 shows the user responses for
background images to be far more favorable than the portrait
case. As evident from Fig. 5, the user’s face constitutes a
small region of such images, with other relevant features. Thus,
resizing, amplifying, and adding the adversarial perturbation
does not make as noticeable a difference as in the portrait image
case. Except for the last range of amplification values, the vast
majority of the respondents agreed to upload the perturbed
image to the social media platform. In the first three ranges of
amplification, we did not observe privacy consciousness to be
a factor in the respondents’ answers (p> 0.05 according to the
Chi-squared test after applying the Holm-Bonferroni method
to correct for multiple comparisons). In one case, one of the
respondents indicated that they do not observe any difference in
the images and wondered whether we are “testing" respondents
by showing the same image for every question. The only
exception was the last amplification range, where large image
perturbation is high enough to be unacceptable to our privacy
conscious respondents.
Finally, it is clear that the choice of the image exhibits a
clear distinction in the user’s perception of the perturbation
(p = 0 according to the Chi-squared test when comparing
background and portrait responses over the same ranges of
amplification). This distinction holds for all, NPC, and PC
respondents. Users are typically more interested in preserving
their privacy in situations related to a certain activity, behavior,
or social context [3]. A portrait image contains little context
about a user activity or behavior. On the other hand, background
images contain more context related to user activity, behavior,
location, and social circles. For these images, users have a
high incentive to avoid being automatically tagged and tracked
by social media platforms.
The observations from our user study show that Face-Off
improves on the privacy-utility trade-off of users. Most of the
respondents have no problem in uploading the background
and perturbed image, regardless of their privacy stance. Even
for portrait images, a part of privacy-conscious respondents
accepted uploading perturbed images.
VII. OFFLINE PARAMETER SELECTION
To determine the parameters needed at runtime, we study
the effect of perturbation amplification on transferability using
the MNIST [14] and CIFAR-10 [13] classification tasks. For
each classification task, we train two networks: the first as a
substitute network which we use to generate the adversarial
examples, and the second as a black box model on which we
test the amplified adversarial example. We trained the substitute
models to accept images at a smaller size than the black box
model to mimic our application scenario. Once the perturbed
example is generated, we resize the perturbation to the image’s
original size, add it to the original image. For this section,
we report transferability as the portion of examples that are
misclassified by the black box model.
We trained two networks for the MNIST classification task:
the substitute model is a 6-layer CNN with an image input
size of 20×20; this model has a test accuracy of 99.4%. The
black box model is a CNN of a similar structure but accepts
input images of size 28×28; this model has a test accuracy of
99.35%. For the CIFAR-10 task, we trained a 6-layer CNN as
a substitute model that accepts input images of size 20×20;
the test accuracy of the model is 72%. The black box for the
(a) MNIST & CW (b) MNIST & PGD (c) CIFAR-10 & CW (d) CIFAR-10 & PGD
Fig. 8: Transferability to (a) MNIST model with CW attack, (b) MNIST model with PGD attack, (c) CIFAR-10 model with
CW attack, (d) CIFAR-10 model with PGD attack.
(a) MNIST & CW (b) MNIST & PGD (c) CIFAR-10 & CW (d) CIFAR-10 & PGD
Fig. 9: Perturbation `2-norm with at least 85% transferability to (a) MNIST model with CW attack, (b) MNIST model with
PGD attack, (c) CIFAR-10 model with CW attack, (d) CIFAR-10 model with PGD attack.
CIFAR-10 dataset is VGG-based that accepts inputs of size
32×32 and has a test accuracy of 93.59%.
Using the test set of both MNIST and CIFAR-10 tasks,
we generate adversarial versions for each element of the test
set, using two attacks: CW and PGD. For each attack, we
varied the number of iterations and the input parameters: κ
and ε for the CW and PGD attacks, respectively. For the CW
attack, we generate an adversarial example of each element
in the test set using 72 configurations of κ and number of
iterations. For the PGD attack, we generate 84 different versions
varying ε and the number of iterations. Finally, we amplify
the perturbations (in each configuration for both datasets over
the CW and PGD attacks) with the amplification factor (α)
varying between 1 and 25 at 0.25 increments. Our objective
in this experiment is two-fold: we aim to study the impact of
amplification on transferability, and whether amplification can
reduce the runtime of generating the adversarial example.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the transferability for the the
datasets over the two attacks. In particular, Fig. 8 shows the
transferability for several values of ε and κ over the highest
number of iterations utilized. For a fair comparison, we plot
transferability as a function of the `2-norm of the perturbation
(=‖αδ‖2). In Fig. 9, we report the minimum `2-norm of the
perturbation required to achieve 85% transferability to the black
box model. There are several insights that can be drawn from
the plots in both figures regarding amplification and its effect
on transferability. We list them below.
1. Running PGD or CW attacks with a high number of iterations
result in adversarial examples that transfer better. However,
this is at the expense of increased runtime. Fig. 9 shows
the minimum level of perturbation needed to achieve 85%
transferability as a function of the number of iterations. For
the MNIST dataset, running PGD or CW attacks at low κ
and ε and a small number of iterations is enough to achieve
high transferability, aided by larger amplification (Fig. 9a and
Fig. 9b). For the MNIST dataset and CW attack with parameters
κ = 5 at 500 iterations is enough to generate the examples that
transfer with low amplification. Similarly, for the PGD attack
applied on MNIST, at 40 iterations an ε value of 4 achieves
85% transferability at a low amplification.
2. Amplification does improve the transferability for both
attacks. Adversarial examples generated over the substitute
model do not transfer directly to the black box model;
this observation is evident from transferability at the lowest
perturbation in four plots (corresponding to the point of no
amplification). In all four plots of Fig. 8, amplification increases
transferability at the expense of higher perturbation (and
consequently human discernibility). The effect of amplification
holds over different parameters of both the CW and PGD
attacks for both datasets.
3. The CW attacks achieve the same degree of transferability
at lower amplification than the PGD attack. This insight can
be observed by comparing Fig. 8a with Fig. 8b and Fig. 8c
with Fig. 8d. This can be explained through the nature of both
attacks; while the PGD attack searches for any adversarial
example within a sphere of radius equal to ε , the CW attack
attempts to find the shortest distance to an adversarial example
with the lowest perturbation subject to a margin of κ .
4. Adversarial perturbations, surprisingly, survive image resiz-
ing. In our experiments, we generate the adversarial example
on an image of size 20×20 for both datasets over both attacks.
As evident from Fig. 8, amplified, and resized perturbations
transfer to black box models. This observation is critical to the
design of Face-Off.
5. Running attacks with lower margins converge much faster
but result in examples with low transferability. The results of
CIFAR-10 dataset emphasize the impact of amplification at
reducing the needed number of iterations. In this case, the
substitute and black box models are very different and are
thus more representative of real-world transferability. In both
plots of Fig. 9c and Fig. 9d lower values of κ and ε achieve
85% transferability for lower perturbation and low number of
iterations as compared to using higher number of iterations. For
example, in Fig. 9c, κ=60 converges faster than higher values.
After 50 iterations, amplification achieves 85% transferability at
nearly the same perturbation level needed for a higher number
of iterations for higher κ . Also, Fig. 9d shows that ε=2 achieves
85% transferability at 20 iterations for the same perturbation
needed for higher ε at a higher number of iterations.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
The current implementation of Face-Off can generate ad-
versarial examples using two attacks (CW, PGD), using two
models (center, triplet), using two loss functions (target, hinge).
Here, we study which configurations transfer these adversarial
examples to commercial face recognition services - Azure Face
API, Amazon Rekognition, and Face++ Cognitive Services.
A. White box Models
Our white box attack is carried out on two state-of-the-art
face verification models - the triplet loss model [25], and center
loss face model [36].
More details about Facenet’s architecture are available in
the original paper [25]. Facenet generates a 128-dimensional
embedding for each input face, and uses the `2-norm between
embeddings for verification. Although Google did not release
their trained model to the public, a popular model with 99.65%
accuracy on Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset is
available6.
The model (originally created in Caffe) was converted to a
Keras implementation to ensure compatibility and consistency.
In the center loss face model, the output of the fully connected
layer serves as the face embedding, and is of dimension 512.
As before, `2-norm between embeddings is used for verification.
The reported validation accuracy on LFW is 99.28%.
6https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
B. Black box Models
All the aforementioned APIs accept two images as input
(henceforth referred to as one query). They return a confidence
value indicating how similar these images are, and a threshold
above which these images are marked the same (i.e. the
faces match). The Azure API returns confidence values in
the range [0,1], and is rate-limited. Amazon Rekognition, on
the other hand, returns confidence values in the range [0,100],
but only accepts S3 objects as queries. Face++ also returns
confidence values in the same range as Amazon, but accepts
URLs as queries. While both Azure and Amazon’s APIs have
a confidence threshold of 0.5 (and 50 respectively), Face++ has
a dynamic threshold based on the input. To ensure a consistent
comparison, all confidence scores are normalized to values in
[0,1], and the match threshold was chosen as 0.5. We elaborate
on this decision in § VIII-C.
We have empirical evidence that our examples also transfer
to Google’s image search (Fig. 1). However, the lack of a
reverse-image search API from Google makes a systematic
evaluation nearly impossible.
C. Experimental Setup
We chose to design adversarial examples for celebrity faces.
This ensures that there are a large number of images (both
portrait and background) to be perturbed (henceforth referred to
as the subject image), and a large number of images (henceforth
referred to as the test image(s)) to compare against to measure
transferability.
We evaluate all the aforementioned configurations and
observe that the center model and hinge loss combination
performs the best. Due to space limitations, we focus our
discussion on the examples generated using this configuration.
For all the black box models under consideration, each
adversarial example is compared against 5 test images of
the same person, and we report the average confidence value
returned by the APIs. We choose a confidence baseline as 0.5;
confidence scores of 0 suggest that the face recognition model
could not detect a face.
Processing Pipeline: For each subject image, Face-Off first
detects and segments the face, resizes it, and obtains its
adversarial counterpart. Face-Off extracts the perturbation mask,
resizes it, and adds it to the resized subject after amplifying it by
α . Face-Off applies MTCNN [40], a widely used face detector,
to crop out all the faces detected from the image. Then the
faces are down sized to 96×96 and 112×96 for Facenet and
center loss face model, respectively, using bilinear interpolation
available from OpenCV 7. Note that a bulk of the computational
costs rise in the generation of the adversarial example (which
we measure in §VIII-G); the process of detection, resizing and
amplification are computationally efficient.
Evaluation Layout: We first discuss our results for the CW
attack, followed by the results for the PGD attack. For both
attacks, we measure transferability (i.e. if the produced example
7https://docs.opencv.org/2.4
is correctly matched with the test images) across all 3 black
box models, as a function of the `2-norm of the perturbation
(‖αδ‖2). To ensure a fair comparison, all figures are plotted
in the same [0,1] confidence region. We fix the number of
iterations to 500 iterations for the CW attack, and 50 iterations
for the PGD attack. We conducted out all experiments between
July 25 and August 6, 2018. Across all plots, lower the
confidence values, better the privacy gains provided.
We make conservative assumptions about face recognition
systems, and comprehensively evaluate the aforementioned
transferability metric by comparing (a) cropped adversarial
images to a cropped baseline of test images (C vs.C), and
(b) resized adversarial images against a resized baseline of
test images (R vs.R). We resume our discussion by relating
the user-tolerable amplifications observed in § VI with its
corresponding (average) ‖αδ‖2; the `2-norm of the perturbation
is a good indicator of human (im)perceptability, and can act as
a proxy for the amplification factor. Thus, results in this section
are a function of the `2-norm. We conclude with measurements
of system performance such as ideal number of iterations and
wall-clock time required for these iterations.
D. Carlini Wagner
The success of the CW attack is reliant on two factors,
the margin κ , and the amplification factor α . Across all
experiments described in this subsection, we varied κ in [0,5.8]
at increments of 0.2, and varied α from [1,5] at increments of
0.1. We do not report all the graphs due to space restrictions.
Observations: Across all values of κ considered, the R vs.R
case is the most successful (refer Fig. 10a) i.e. the confidence
value is always less than 0.5. For the C vs.C scenario,
there is no transferability at lower amplification factors (< 1);
transferability increases as amplification increases, and we
begin to observe transferability at ‖αδ‖2 ≈ 6 (for Azure),
‖αδ‖2 ≈ 4.5 (for Rekognition), and ‖αδ‖2 ≈ 12 (for Face++).
We also observe that the slope decreases beyond a specific
point across all three models, suggesting that increasing the
amplification factor α will only produce marginal privacy gains.
In the magnified region of the plot (i.e. the upper half), we
observe no correlation between the value of κ and confidence
for both the R vs.R and C vs.C case. This suggests that
the choice of α is more relevant for transferability than the
choice of κ .
Insights:
1. The adversarial examples generated using the CW approach
transfer to all three black box models under consideration, at
the expense of varying levels of ‖αδ‖2.
2. For comparable values of α (and ‖αδ‖2), transferability in
the R vs.R case is better than that in the C vs.C case across
all black box models (refer Fig. 10,11, and 12). This suggests
that the resizing operation further enhances the perturbation
in unintuitive ways, an effect we will be exploring in future
work.
3. The exact choice of κ does little to impact transferability.
4. Transferability increases with α and is better in some models
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 10: Transferability to Azure Face API with CW attack.
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 11: Transferability to AWS Rekognition API with CW
attack.
(Fig. 11a) than others (Fig. 12a). This suggests that some
models are closer to our substitute models than others.
E. Projected Gradient Descent
The success of the PGD attack relies on two factors, ε , and
the amplification factor α . Across all experiments described
in this subsection, we vary ε in [0,5.8] at increments of 0.2,
and vary α in [1,5] at increments of 0.1. The general trend
for PGD is the same as that of CW - R vs.R transfers better
than C vs.C.
Observations: Here, the choice of ε has a greater impact on the
rate of transferability (i.e. how quickly, in terms of amplification,
the example reaches the 0.5 threshold). Larger the value of
ε , faster the transferability (steeper slope), as highlighted
across all models. Larger values of ε , when amplified also
crash the face detector (represented by gaps in the plots), a
phenomena not observed in the CW scenario. In the C vs.C
case, ε = 1 produces an adversarial example that transfers
only when amplified by a large factor (as highlighted by the
large ‖αδ‖2. As before, transferability across different models
requires different levels of ‖αδ‖2 (and consequently, α).
Insights:
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 12: Transferability to Face++ API with CW attack.
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 13: Transferability to Azure Face API with PGD attack.
1. PGD-generated adversarial examples also transfer across all
models. However, they produce far greater perturbation than
those produced by the CW attack; CW attempts at minimizing
the perturbation, which is not the objective of PGD.
2. Larger values of ε transfer faster. Hence, the exact value of
ε under consideration is crucial. This is observed in Fig. 13,
14, and 15.
F. Interpreting Amplification Factors
In our user study, the MTurk workers were shown images of
varying degrees of perturbation (as discussed earlier). A highly
perturbed image (with large amplification factor) is one with
a large `2-norm of perturbation, and a less perturbed image
is one with a low `2-norm. We quantify these `2-norms of
perturbation in terms of amplification factors in Fig. 10, 11
and 12. Subsequently, we plot the `2-norm of the resulting
adversarial image (‖αδ‖2) as a function of amplification.
Fig. 16a and 16b show that transferability occurs at `2-norm
of perturbation larger than 8 for portrait, and larger than 0 for
background.
Takeaway: The aforementioned ranges correspond to the
acceptable amplification factors determined by the user study
in § VI.
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 14: Transferability to AWS Rekognition API with PGD
attack.
(a) R vs.R (b) C vs.C
Fig. 15: Transferability to Face++ API with PGD attack.
G. Execution Time
Fig. 17 shows the time needed to return an adversarially
perturbed face using an Nvidia TITAN Xp GPU (Fig. 17a)
and Intel 4.2 GHz Intel Core i7 (Fig. 17b). Face-Off’s center
model accepts as input faces of fixed size; the image size does
not affect the running time. Rather, the number of iterations
and the batch size (N) control the time consumption. Both
figures (Fig. 17a and Fig. 17b) show the perturbation size (after
amplification) that achieves transferability (failed matching) at
Azure Face API for each number of iterations and batch size.
Those numbers are the same regardless whether the execution
happened on GPU or CPU; we show a subset of them at each
figure for presentation reasons.
On the GPU (Fig. 17a), for the highest number of iterations
and largest batch size, the perturbed image can be generated
within 35 seconds. Nevertheless, because of amplification, a
lower number of iterations and/or a smaller batch size result
in a perturbed face (of similar perturbation size) that transfers
to a black box API. In such a case, an adversarial face can be
generated in less than 10 seconds per image.
Unsurprisingly, when executed locally on a CPU, Face-Off
takes longer to generate an adversarial face. Here, amplification
also helps to reduce the time consumption. As evident from
(a) Portrait (b) Background
Fig. 16: Relationship between amplification and `2-norm and
their effect on transferability to Azure API. Results correspond
to the images used in the user study.
(a) Nvidia TITAN Xp GPU (b) Intel 4.2 GHz Intel Core i7
Fig. 17: Time to generate adversarial examples per face using
the CW attack κ=0. The text next to some data points indicate
the required perturbation size to achieve transferability to Azure
Face API.
Fig. 17b, Face-Off can generate an adversarial face with a
comparable perturbation size to the best case, within 90 seconds.
Depending on the available time budget, the user can tune
the privacy/utility trade-off to generate perturbed faces that
completely transfer with relatively high perturbation or faces
that reduce the social media platform’s confidence with lower
perturbation.
IX. DISCUSSION
We observe that our adversarial examples survive lossy
compression at the expense of modest losses in privacy
(reduction of matching confidence). In Fig. 18, we plot the
difference in confidence values (on the Azure API) between
a test image and an adversarial image, when the adversarial
image is passed as a PNG (lossless compression) and a JPG
(lossy compression). The upper half of the plot are regions
where the JPG has lower confidence than the PNG image, and
vice-versa. We observe that the magnitude of the difference
in confidence values is minimal, suggesting that the choice of
compression standard does not impact the results.
Limitations: We highlight some limitations of Face-Off,
which we hope to address in future work.
1) Like other black box attack schemes [33], [16], [29],
[20], [21], our approach does not provide guarantees
Fig. 18: Adversarial examples survive lossy compression
on transferability. Even with high amplification, the
adversarial examples may still not transfer. However, our
approach always enhances privacy if privacy were to be
measured by the decreasing confidence with which these
metric networks are able to match faces. In addition,
amplification offers users the flexibility to balance the
privacy-utility trade-off; privacy-conscious users can in-
crease amplification and obtain greater privacy, at the
expense of more visible perturbation.
2) While the time required for generating the adversarial
example can potentially bottleneck real-time image upload,
we envision alternate deployment strategies, such as
offline adversarial example generation to circumvent this
bottleneck.
3) A scenario that Face-Off cannot circumvent is when other
people on social media platforms tag faces.
4) The biggest limitation of our work, similar to all other
adversarial example generation strategies, is the ever-
improving robustness of black box models. Increasing
robustness also makes images uploaded earlier at risk of
being tagged correctly.
5) Unlike the work of Sharif et al. [26], we are unaware if
the adversarial examples we generate can be transferred
to the real-world to preserve visual privacy.
X. RELATED WORK
A. Black Box Attacks
As instantiations of earlier attacks, several works demonstrate
that some adversarial examples generated for one model may
also be misclassified by another model [29], [20], [21]. In
[21], the proposed attack strategy is to train a local model
(as a substitute for the target black box) using synthetically
generated inputs. The target DNN labels these inputs. The
adversarial examples generated by the substitute are shown to
be likely misclassified by the target DNN as well. The core
ethos of this work is to use the black box network as a labeling
oracle to generate adversarial examples that transfer.
Another line of work do not utilize the black box models
for the example generation process i.e. the black box model is
never queried; work from Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. showed
the existence of a universal perturbation for each model
which can transfer across different images [19]. Yanpei et al.
conducted a study of the transferability of different adversarial
instance generation strategies applied to different models [33].
The authors also proposed to use an ensemble of multiple
models to generate adversarial examples to obtain increased
transferability.
B. Privacy
Prior to our work, initial explorations have been made
to utilize adversarial examples for protecting visual privacy.
Raval et al.. developed a perturbation mechanism that jointly
optimizes privacy and utility objectives [23]. Focusing on
standard image classifiers, the authors formulate game theory
problem between an obfuscator and an attacker. The attacker
aims to identify visual secrets in the images perturbed by the
obfuscator, while the obfuscator perturbs images such that the
perturbed images are similar to the original images as well as
fool the attacker.
Targeting face recognition systems, Sharif et al.. developed
a physical attack approach [26], [27]. The proposed algorithm
first performs an adversarial attack on digital face images and
limits the perturbation to an eyeglass frame-shaped area. This is
achieved by applying a binary mask on perturbation during the
adversarial attack. Then the adversarial perturbation is printed
into a pair of physical eyeglasses and can be worn by a person
to dodge face detection, or to impersonate others in these face
recognition systems. Being able to bring an adversarial attack
into the physical world, this approach preserves visual privacy
against face recognition.
The work of Bose et al. [4] is most similar to ours. However,
it targets Faster R-CNN [24] face detectors. Given white
box access to a face detector, the proposed scheme trains a
generator against it for a given image. The generated adversarial
perturbation aims to dodge the face detector so that the faces
are not detected. This scheme has two primary differences
compared to our work: (i) Bose et al. attacks face detectors,
while we target face recognition. Thus, we are able to preserve
the utility of numerous applications built atop face detection
and recognition systems. (ii) Their work attacks a white box
system, while we extend the attack to black box online face
recognition APIs.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tackle the problem of face recognition by
designing Face-Off, a framework that obfuscates face images
through the use of adversarial perturbations. We propose
two new loss functions that fit metric learning systems;
these are compatible with both the CW and PGD attack
frameworks to produce adversarial examples. Through extensive
empirical evaluation, we conclude that a small multiplicative
amplification factor ensures greater transferability to several
commercial black box models. We observe that, surprisingly,
the perturbations produced survive both image resizing and
lossy compression. In future work, we hope to extend these
digital attacks into the physical world and utilize similar
techniques to address the privacy threats from modalities such
as video and text.
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